That was just your life: rethinking dementia for advance directives.

Over the past decades, literature in dementia ethics has extensively looked at moral questions revolving around the care of older people living with dementia. Particularly prevalent are autonomy-related concerns regarding topics such as advance directives. In this paper, we argue that these discussions are crucially premised on how dementia is understood and represented. Despite the multiplicity of dementia presentations in people, the dominant discourse predominantly frames dementia as 'monstrous,' an 'enemy,' a destructive experience in need of eradication. We contend that such a monolithic approach, from a moral standpoint, is problematic in several respects. Indeed, framing heavily influences the way dementia is understood and experienced, leading to stigmatization, bias, and distress. Not only does it influence decisions and discussions on advance directives, but we argue that this flawed understanding of dementia is rooted in and contributes to epistemic harm. In the first section, we introduce the ethics of advance directives. More specifically, we introduce the view developed by Dworkin who has largely influenced the debate by making the case for advance directives by grounding them in the principles of autonomy and beneficence. In the second section, we show how dementia is still mostly framed monolithically as a 'destructive experience.' We then show that this framing is problematic because it oversteps the different pathologies dementia implies, which leads to an inaccurate representation of the condition. In the third section, we present possible alternative framings: dementia as normal aging, a person-centered care framework, and an embodied view. In the fourth section, drawing on recent developments in the epistemic injustice literature, we explore how maintaining and utilizing flawed understandings of dementia may lead to distinct moral-epistemic harms for those living with dementia and inform ongoing discussions on advance directives. Finally, in the concluding section, we return to the case of advance directives and what the implications of rethinking dementia are.