Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39116135›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2024

Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.

Yohsuke Murase, Christian Hilbe

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency-robustness trade-off.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  2. On the optimal integration of intelligent agents into network systems to steer cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Institutions of public judgment established by social contract and taxation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  6. Picking strategies in games of cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Evolution of trust in theJournal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2025
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Yohsuke MuraseRIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe 650-0047, Japan.ORCID 0000-0002-5872-420X
Christian HilbeMax Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.ORCID 0000-0001-5116-955X

Funding

EC | ERC | HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council (ERC) 850529MEXT | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) 21K03362 21KK0247 22H00815
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Models of indirect reciprocity study how social norms promote cooperation. In these models, cooperative individuals build up a positive reputation, which in turn helps them in their future interactions. The exact reputational benefits of cooperation depend on the norm in place, which may change over time. Previous research focused on the stability of social norms. Much less is known about how social norms initially evolve when competing with many others. A comprehensive evolutionary analysis, however, has been difficult. Even among the comparably simple space of so-called third-order norms, there are thousands of possibilities, each one inducing its own reputation dynamics. To address this challenge, we use large-scale computer simulations. We study the reputation dynamics of each third-order norm and all evolutionary transitions between them. In contrast to established work with only a handful of norms, we find that cooperation is hard to maintain in well-mixed populations. However, within group-structured populations, cooperation can emerge. The most successful norm in our simulations is particularly simple. It regards cooperation as universally positive, and defection as usually negative-unless defection takes the form of justified punishment. This research sheds light on the complex interplay of social norms, their induced reputation dynamics, and population structure.

Indexed as

Computer SimulationPopulation DynamicsSocial EvolutionSocial NormsCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryHumansMarkov ChainsMonte Carlo MethodSoftwareevolutionary game theoryevolution of cooperationindirect reciprocitysocial norms

Identifiers

PMID39116135
PMCPMC11331111

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.