Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39102074›Full record

ArticleBulletin of mathematical biology2024

Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations.

M H Duong, C M Durbac, T A Han

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Bulletin of mathematical biology, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

M H DuongSchool of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
C M DurbacSchool of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK. cmd639@student.bham.ac.uk.ORCID 0000-0002-8952-9597
T A HanSchool of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK.

Funding

Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council NIA EP/W008041/1Royal Society EP/Y00857X/1Royal Society IES-R3-223047
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In this scheme, the individuals in the population interact via cooperation dilemmas (Donation Game or Public Goods Game) in which institutional reward is carried out only if cooperation is not abundant enough (i.e., the number of cooperators is below a threshold

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryMathematical ConceptsMotivationPunishmentRewardComputer SimulationHumansMutationPopulation DensityPopulation DynamicsEvolutionary game theoryPopulation dynamics

Identifiers

PMID39102074
PMCPMC11300551

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.