Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39100991›Full record

ArticleLancet regional health. Americas2024

Analysis of public records of lobbying practices of the ultra-processed sugary food and drink industries in Chile: a qualitative study.

Yanela Aravena-Rivas, Anja Heilmann, Richard G Watt, Tom Broomhead, Georgios Tsakos

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Lancet regional health. Americas, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
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  8. Article
  9. Acting on the Commercial Determinants of Health.Health promotion international · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Yanela Aravena-RivasDepartment of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.
Anja HeilmannDepartment of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.
Richard G WattDepartment of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.
Tom BroomheadUnit of Oral Health, Dentistry and Society, School of Clinical Dentistry, University of Sheffield, 19 Claremont Crescent, Sheffield, S10 2TA, UK.
Georgios TsakosDepartment of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London, WC1E 7HB, UK.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Background: Given the role of commercial determinants on sugar consumption and health, this study aimed to describe lobbying practices of the ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries in Chile between 2014 and 2022. Methods: Official meetings between ultra-processed sugary food and drinks industries and related commercial actors and Chilean government officials were obtained from the Chilean Lobby Registry. Relevant commercial names were initially identified based on their market share and expanded iteratively based on information from relevant meetings. Qualitative analysis followed a deductive-inductive approach using the Corporate Political Activity Model to identify and classify objectives, framing and action strategies. Findings: From 237 records identified, the Ministries of Health, Social Development, and Economy were the most frequently lobbied. Industry representatives sought to achieve their short- and long-term objectives by targeting a diverse range of authorities, including Ministers and Under-secretaries, using different strategies. Framing strategies focused on presenting sugary food and drinks industries as socially responsible and legitimate policy actors and criticised public health initiatives as 'bad solutions'. Action strategies aimed to influence policymaking and nurture corporate reputations. Interpretation: Extensive lobbying took place by the sugary food and drinks industries between 2014 and 2022, a period when major public health policies were being discussed in Chile. Lobbying strategies varied to meet industry objectives and targeted a diverse range of government institutions including high-ranking officials. Tighter regulations to stop inappropriate industry influence in public health policymaking are urgently required. Funding: Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (Chile)-PhD Scholarship. University College London-Open Access fees.

Indexed as

ChileCommercial determinants of healthHealth policyLobbyingSugar

Identifiers

PMID39100991
PMCPMC11294830

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.