Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39086813›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in public health2024

The cross-regional settlement methods in hospitals and the treatment-seeking behavior of patients with malignant tumors in China: an evolutionary game model.

Xinzhe Zhao, Linjin Li, Dan Zhang

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Article in Frontiers in public health, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

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4citing papers in PubMed
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4 citing papers in PubMed.

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Xinzhe ZhaoGenertec Universal Medical Group, Beijing, China.
Linjin LiInstitute for Hospital Management, Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University, Shenzhen, China.
Dan ZhangInstitute for Hospital Management, Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University, Shenzhen, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Background: Cross-regional settlement management is a key indicator of national health insurance system maturity. Given the significant demand for cross-regional medical treatment among Chinese patients with malignant tumors and the territorially managed health insurance system, further research is necessary to explore the relationship between hospital settlement methods and treatment-seeking behaviors among these patients. This study introduces and validates an evolutionary game model that provides a theoretical foundation for direct settlement policies in cross-regional treatment. Methods: An evolutionary game model was constructed with patients and hospitals serving as strategic players within a dynamic system. This model integrates the patients' treatment utility, medical and nonmedical costs, and hospitals' financial and technological advancement benefits. Results: The evolutionary stability analysis revealed seven-game outcomes between hospitals and patients with malignant tumors. The numerical simulations suggest an evolutionary convergence toward strategy (1, 0), indicating a trend where patients with malignant tumors opt for cross-regional treatment, yet hospitals choose not to implement a direct settlement policy. Parameter sensitivity analysis showed that the parameters set in this study affected player behavioral choices and game equilibria. Conclusion: A strong demand for cross-regional medical treatment among Chinese patients with malignant tumors, and some hospitals require more incentives to implement cross-regional settlements. The key factors influencing the willingness of some patients with malignant tumors to resettle include the costs of in-area medical care, costs of cross-regional treatment without direct settlement, and the utility of cross-regional treatment. Technological advancement benefits and input costs influence some hospitals' motivation to adopt cross-regional settlements. Policy adjustments that effectively implement direct settlement policies can facilitate equilibrium, enhance the initiatives of some local health insurance management departments, improve the accessibility and efficiency of medical services, and reduce nonmedical expenses for patients.

Indexed as

Game TheoryNeoplasmsChinaHospitalsHumansModels, TheoreticalNational Health ProgramsPatient Acceptance of Health Carecross-regional treatmentdirect settlementevolutionary gamemalignant tumorstreatment-seeking behavior

Identifiers

PMID39086813
PMCPMC11289844

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.