Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39013425›Full record

ArticleProceedings. Biological sciences2024

Third-party arbitration and forgiving strategies increase cooperation when perception errors are common.

Hillary Lenfesty, Sarah Mathew, Thomas Fikes, Cody T Ross, Robert Boyd

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings. Biological sciences, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Hillary LenfestySchool of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA.ORCID 0009-0005-6098-0076
Sarah MathewSchool of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-3614-3276
Thomas FikesEdPlus Action Lab, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA.
Cody T RossDepartment of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103 Leipzig, Germany.
Robert BoydSchool of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Humans cooperate in groups in which mutual monitoring is common, and this provides the possibility of third-party arbitration. Third-party arbitration stabilizes reciprocity in at least two ways: first, when it is accurate, it reduces the frequency of misunderstandings resulting from perception errors, and second, even when it is inaccurate, it provides a public signal that allows pairs to align their expectations about how to behave after errors occur. Here, we describe experiments that test for these two effects. We find that in an iterated, sequential Prisoner's Dilemma game with errors, players with the highest average payoffs are those who make use of third-party arbitration and who also employ forgiving strategies. The combination of these two behaviours reduces the detrimental effects of errors on reciprocity, resulting in more cooperation.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorForgivenessGame TheoryHumansInterpersonal RelationsNegotiatingPerceptionPrisoner Dilemmaaltruismcooperationexperimental gamesrobustness to error

Identifiers

PMID39013425
PMCPMC11251755

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.