Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38931643›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2024

Efficient Cyberattack Detection Methods in Industrial Control Systems.

Piotr Marusak, Robert Nebeluk, Andrzej Wojtulewicz, Krzysztof Cabaj, Patryk Chaber, Maciej Ławryńczuk, Sebastian Plamowski, Krzysztof Zarzycki

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

8 authors.

Piotr MarusakInstitute of Control and Computation Engineering, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0002-6556-7919
Robert NebelukInstitute of Control and Computation Engineering, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0002-1152-8690
Andrzej WojtulewiczInstitute of Control and Computation Engineering, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-6984-391X
Krzysztof CabajInstitute of Computer Science, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0002-5955-5890
Patryk ChaberInstitute of Control and Computation Engineering, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0003-0257-8255
Maciej ŁawryńczukInstitute of Control and Computation Engineering, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0002-6846-2004
Sebastian PlamowskiInstitute of Control and Computation Engineering, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-6610-8039
Krzysztof ZarzyckiInstitute of Control and Computation Engineering, Faculty of Electronics and Information Technology, Warsaw University of Technology, 00-665 Warsaw, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-8436-7325

Funding

NCBR CYBERSECIDENT/488240/IV/NCBR/2021
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The article deals with the issue of detecting cyberattacks on control algorithms running in a real Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) and controlling a real laboratory control plant. The vulnerability of the widely used Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller is investigated. Four effective, easy-to-implement, and relatively robust methods for detecting attacks on the control signal, output variable, and parameters of the PID controller are researched. The first method verifies whether the value of the control signal sent to the control plant in the previous step is the actual value generated by the controller. The second method relies on detecting sudden, unusual changes in output variables, taking into account the inertial nature of dynamic plants. In the third method, a copy of the controller parameters is used to detect an attack on the controller's parameters implemented in the PLC. The fourth method uses the golden run in attack detection.

Indexed as

cyberattackcybersecurityindustrial control systemPID control

Identifiers

PMID38931643
PMCPMC11207342

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.