Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38920527›Full record

ArticleEntropy (Basel, Switzerland)2024

The Universal Optimism of the Self-Evidencing Mind.

Elizabeth L Fisher, Jakob Hohwy

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Entropy (Basel, Switzerland), 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Five Fristonian Formulae.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025
    Article
  2. Article
  3. An Active Inference Model of the Optimism Bias.Computational psychiatry (Cambridge, Mass.) · 2025
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Elizabeth L FisherMonash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia.ORCID 0000-0002-9557-9291
Jakob HohwyMonash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia.ORCID 0000-0003-3906-3060

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Karl Friston's free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, 'wishful'. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli's oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle.

Indexed as

active inferenceepistemologyfree-energy principleFristonMachiavellioptimism biasself-evidencingwishful thinking

Identifiers

PMID38920527
PMCPMC11202793

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.