ArticlePloS one2024
An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of the "multi-agent co-governance" system of unfair competition on internet platforms.
Article in PloS one, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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Abstract
The increasingly prominent issue of unfair competition on Internet platforms (IPUC) severely restricts the healthy and sustainable development of the platform economy. Based on the IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" scenario, this paper introduces stochastic disturbances and continuous strategy set to improve the classical binary deterministic evolutionary game system. The results show that after considering stochastic disturbances, the positive state corresponding to the equilibrium point (1,1) is no longer stable, and the required parameter conditions are more stringent. The IPUC "multi-agent co-governance" system under stochastic disturbances exhibits specific vulnerability. In the continuous strategy set evolutionary game system, government departments and Internet platforms can flexibly make optimal decisions based on maximizing expected returns, and strategy selection has better elasticity. Regardless of the evolutionary game scenario, maintaining the participation level of NGOs and the public above a certain threshold while increasing the penalty intensity is conducive to the evolution of the game system toward the positive state. The analysis process and conclusions provide insights and guidance for the governments to design the IPUC regulatory system and frameworks.
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