Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38887627›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in psychology2024

Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them.

Darius Parvizi-Wayne, Lars Sandved-Smith, Riddhi J Pitliya, Jakub Limanowski, Miles R A Tufft, Karl J Friston

Erratum issuedAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Review
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. From pixels to planning: scale-free active inference.Frontiers in network physiology · 2025
    Article
  9. Flow and intuition: a systems neuroscience comparison.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2025
    Article
  10. Review
  11. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Darius Parvizi-WayneDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Lars Sandved-SmithMonash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia.
Riddhi J PitliyaDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
Jakub LimanowskiInstitute of Psychology, University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany.
Miles R A TufftDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Karl J FristonVERSES AI Research Lab, Los Angeles, CA, United States.

Funding

Wellcome Trust
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.

Indexed as

active inferenceconsciousnessembodied cognitionphenomenologypredictive processingself-awareness

Identifiers

PMID38887627
PMCPMC11182004

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.