ArticleFrontiers in psychology2024
Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them.
Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 11 papers.
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Who cites it
11 citing papers in PubMed.
- Predictive Processing in Sport and Exercise Science: A Scoping Review and Theoretical Overview.Sports medicine - open · 2026Review
- The "Feeling" of inattention: ADHD symptoms and mind wandering beyond remembered thought content.Psychological research · 2026Article
- Stimulating flow in MOBA games: a moderated serial mediation model of gamification mechanics, perceived competence, and player retention.BMC psychology · 2026Article
- Strange attractors: purpose, synchronicity, flow, and the neurodynamics of meaning.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2026Review
- The impact of educational digitalization on life satisfaction: an empirical analysis based on PISA 2022.Frontiers in psychology · 2026Article
- From self-organizing systems to subjective temporal extension.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2026Article
- Effortful leisure is a source of meaning in everyday life.Communications psychology · 2025Article
- From pixels to planning: scale-free active inference.Frontiers in network physiology · 2025Article
- Flow and intuition: a systems neuroscience comparison.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2025Article
- When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome.Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience · 2024Review
- Principled Limitations on Self-Representation for Generic Physical Systems.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
- Erratum issued
Authors and funding
6 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.