Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38820464›Full record

ArticlePloS one2024

Smart transition pathways and development incentive mechanism of China's smart community elderly care industry under market dominance: Considering a multi-subjective behavior game.

Qinghua Mao, Yining Mao, Qilong Sun, Linyao Xu

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Qinghua MaoSchool of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China.
Yining MaoSchool of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China.ORCID 0009-0004-6773-1585
Qilong SunSchool of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China.
Linyao XuSchool of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Against the backdrop of an aging population, China is actively experimenting with an innovative elderly care model, so smart community elderly care has recently received widespread attention. However, the results of the implementation of the model have not yet met the expectation due to the variety of interests among the relevant participants. In this study, we identified the most core stakeholders in smart community elderly care, developed a four-party evolutionary game model including local governments, communities, service supply enterprises and households with elderly members. By applying the system dynamics method, we simulate the evolutionary paths and explore the complex interactions at the multiparticipant level in order to facilitate the transition of community elderly care services from traditional to smart, and then propose managerial insights for accelerating the construction of smart community elderly care. The results suggest that: (1) the four players in the game influence each other and are intimately related, and the benign interaction between them will further stimulate the vitality of the smart community elderly care industry; (2) appropriate improvement in policy support will strongly promote smart community elderly care, and the incentive effect on the demand side (households with elderly members) is more significant; (3) when households' preference for smart services increases, and the perceived value to communities and enterprises reaches a certain threshold, communities and enterprises will actively adopt smart solution and technology as well as develop stable portfolio strategy; (4) measures such as simultaneously increasing the level of smart and resource synergy will promote the system evolution toward smart services, and the system is more sensitive to the internal behavior of the enterprise than the external behavior between community and enterprise.

Indexed as

Health Services for the AgedAgedChinaGame TheoryHumansMotivation

Identifiers

PMID38820464
PMCPMC11142596

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.