Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38800366›Full record

ReviewPatterns (New York, N.Y.)2024

AI deception: A survey of examples, risks, and potential solutions.

Peter S Park, Simon Goldstein, Aidan O'Gara, Michael Chen, Dan Hendrycks

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Patterns (New York, N.Y.), 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 22 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
22citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

22 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Evolvable AI needs operational risk thresholds.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Design principles for integrated AI alignment.Patterns (New York, N.Y.) · 2026
    Review
  4. Large language models pass a standard three-party Turing test.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Reflection: AI as a catalyst for change in postgraduate medical education.Journal of the colleges of medicine of South Africa · 2026
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. The benefits and dangers of anthropomorphic conversational agents.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  13. Frontier AI developers need an internal audit function.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2025
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Deception abilities emerged in large language models.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  20. Do you feel like (A)I feel?Frontiers in psychology · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Peter S ParkDepartment of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
Simon GoldsteinDianoia Institute of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, East Melbourne, VIC 3002, Australia.
Aidan O'GaraCenter for AI Safety, San Francisco, CA 94111, USA.
Michael ChenCenter for AI Safety, San Francisco, CA 94111, USA.
Dan HendrycksCenter for AI Safety, San Francisco, CA 94111, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) and general-purpose AI systems (including large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI. Finally, we outline several potential solutions: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Identifiers

PMID38800366
PMCPMC11117051

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.