Semiquantitative Risk Evaluation Reveals Drivers of African Swine Fever Virus Transmission in Smallholder Pig Farms and Gaps in Biosecurity, Tanzania.

African swine fever (ASF) has remained persistent in Tanzania since the early 2000s. Between 2020 and 2021, pig farms in twelve districts in Tanzania were infected with ASF, and ≥4,804 pigs reportedly died directly due to the disease with disruption to livelihoods. We conducted semiquantitative field investigations and rapid risk assessment (RRA) to understand the risk factors and drivers of ASF virus (ASFV) amplification and transmission in smallholder pig farms, and determine the gaps in biosecurity through hazard profiling, focus group discussions and expert opinion. Outbreaks were connected by road and aligned along the pig product value chain and reported in the northern, central, and southern parts of Tanzania. The patterns of outbreaks and impacts differed among districts, but cases of ASF appeared to be self-limiting following significant mortality of pigs in farms. Movement of infected pigs, movement of contaminated pig products, and fomites associated with service providers, vehicles, and equipment, as well as the inadvertent risks associated with movements of animal health practitioners, visitors, and scavengers were the riskiest pathways to introduce ASFV into smallholder pig farms. Identified drivers and facilitators of risk of ASFV infection in smallholder pig farms were traders in whole pigs, middlemen, pig farmers, transporters, unauthorized animal health service providers, and traders in pork. All identified pig groups were susceptible to ASFV, particularly shared adult boars, pregnant and lactating sows, and other adult females. The risk of ASF for smallholder pig farms in Tanzania remains very high based on a systematic risk classification. The majority of the farms had poor biosecurity and no single farm implemented all identified biosecurity measures. Risky practices and breaches of biosecurity in the pig value chain in Tanzania are profit driven and are extremely difficult to change. Behavioural change communication must target identified drivers of infections, attitudes, and practices.