ArticleNature communications2024
Heuristics in risky decision-making relate to preferential representation of information.
Article in Nature communications, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Trial-by-trial learning of successor representations in human behavior.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2025Article
- Trial-by-trial learning of successor representations in human behavior.PLoS computational biology · 2025Article
- Examining measurement discrepancies in adolescent screen media activity with insights from the ABCD study.Npj mental health research · 2025Article
- Heuristics in risky decision-making relate to preferential representation of information.Nature communications · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
5 authors.
Funding
Abstract
When making choices, individuals differ from one another, as well as from normativity, in how they weigh different types of information. One explanation for this relates to idiosyncratic preferences in what information individuals represent when evaluating choice options. Here, we test this explanation with a simple risky-decision making task, combined with magnetoencephalography (MEG). We examine the relationship between individual differences in behavioral markers of information weighting and neural representation of stimuli pertinent to incorporating that information. We find that the extent to which individuals (N = 19) behaviorally weight probability versus reward information is related to how preferentially they neurally represent stimuli most informative for making probability and reward comparisons. These results are further validated in an additional behavioral experiment (N = 88) that measures stimulus representation as the latency of perceptual detection following priming. Overall, the results suggest that differences in the information individuals consider during choice relate to their risk-taking tendencies.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.