Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38746925›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in psychology2024

A study of the impact of staggered boards on corporate financialization: from the perspective of board governance.

Chongyan Cao, Yutong Zhang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Chongyan CaoSchool of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, China.
Yutong ZhangSchool of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Introduction: The objective of this study is to assess the influence of staggered boards on corporate financialization and the role that incentive and supervision mechanisms play in this process. Methods: We employ a total of 20,647 panel data samples of Chinese A-share listed companies over the period 2011-2020 to empirically test the impact of staggered boards on corporate financialization in the Chinese context. Results: The results indicate that implementing staggered boards significantly increases levels of corporate financialization. On the one hand, the implementation of a staggered board structure can exacerbate the speculative mindset and profit-driven behavior among board members, leading management to prioritize financial investments for personal gain. On the other hand, a staggered board system may also amplify managerial laziness, potentially incentivizing them to rely heavily on financial investments in order to swiftly achieve performance targets with minimal effort. Furthermore, both managerial ownership and audit supervision are found to be critical factors in mitigating this positive impact and preventing excessive financial investment behavior. Discussion: This paper offers guidance on comprehending the applicability of staggered board provisions and mitigating financial risks in enterprises.

Indexed as

audit supervisionboard governancecorporate financializationmanagerial ownershipstaggered boards

Identifiers

PMID38746925
PMCPMC11091370

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.