ArticleHeliyon2024
Prevention of food fraud and fraud emulation among companies in the supply chain based on a social Co-governance framework.
Article in Heliyon, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
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Authors and funding
5 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model among upstream raw material producers, midstream food producers, and downstream distributors in the food supply chain, and investigates food fraud and fraud emulation among companies in the same group based on a food safety social co-governance framework. Moreover, the equilibrium points are divided into four scenarios according to the number of groups of companies committing fraud in the supply chain and whether companies in the same group emulate each other's fraudulent behavior. The stability conditions of these scenarios are also discussed and verified by numerical simulation in MATLAB. The results show that the behavioral strategy choices of different groups of food companies in the supply chain are closely related to the level of social co-governance involving the government, market, and consumers. Government regulation, supervision between companies, and consumer reporting can all change companies' behavioral strategies. Although the level of fraud emulation among companies in the same group does not change their behavioral strategy choice, it affects the time it takes for their behavioral strategy to evolve to a stable state. Moreover, the level of social co-governance directly affects companies' behavioral strategy choices at different emulation levels.
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