ArticlePloS one2024
Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories.
Article in PloS one, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
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Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
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Abstract
While conspiracy theories are treated as irrational fringe beliefs in popular culture, conspiracy belief is quite common. Given the disconnect between stereotypes about conspiracy belief and its prevalence, I tested whether people have difficulty recognizing the conspiracy theories that they believe as conspiracy theories. Across two studies I demonstrate that people have considerable difficulty identifying conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories, particularly when they do not take much time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. This is consistent with the notion that people experience "conspiracy blindness." People have trouble recognizing the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories because they do not take the time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. In Study 2, I demonstrate that people can overcome their conspiracy blindness and recognize the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories when they are given a definition for "conspiracy theory" and asked to consider their answer. This suggests that people are typically ignorant of their own conspiracy beliefs, but capable of recognizing them when given the tools and motivation to do so. However, recognizing their beliefs as conspiracy theories does not reduce their adherence to those beliefs.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.