Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38594081›Full record

ArticleHealth services research2024

Restrictiveness of Medicare Advantage provider networks across physician specialties.

Yevgeniy Feyman, Jose Figueroa, Melissa Garrido, Gretchen Jacobson, Michael Adelberg, Austin Frakt

Open access · greenAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health services research, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
15citing papers in PubMed
22.6field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

15 citing papers in PubMed, 20 citations in OpenAlex.

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  14. Medicare Advantage Enrollment and Total Medicare Program Spending.Inquiry : a journal of medical care organization, provision and financing
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors at 5 institutions in 1 country.

Yevgeniy FeymanOffice of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-7372-7671
Jose FigueroaDepartment of Health Policy & Management, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-3811-257X
Melissa GarridoPartnered Evidence-Based Policy Resource Center, VA Boston Healthcare System, and Department of Health Law, Policy and Management, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-8986-3536
Gretchen JacobsonCommonwealth Fund, New York, New York, USA.
Michael AdelbergNational Association of Dental Plans, Dallas, Texas, USA.
Austin FraktPartnered Evidence-Based Policy Resource Center, VA Boston Healthcare System, and Department of Health Law, Policy and Management, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-0795-5462
Boston University · USCommonwealth Fund · USDelta Dental Plans Association · USHarvard University · USOffice of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation · US

Funding

A National Analysis of the Extent and Value of Medicare Advantage Physician NetworksR01AG068122 · NIA · HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH · PI FRAKT, AUSTIN B. · 2021 to 2023
$1.6M
NIA NIH HHS R01 AG068122
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveThe objective was to measure specialty provider networks in Medicare Advantage (MA) and examine associations with market factors. DATA SOURCES AND STUDY

settingWe relied on traditional Medicare (TM) and MA prescription drug event data from 2011 to 2017 for all Medicare beneficiaries in the United States as well as data from the Area Health Resources File. STUDY

designRelying on a recently developed and validated prediction model, we calculated the provider network restrictiveness of MA contracts for nine high-prescribing specialties. We characterized network restrictiveness through an observed-to-expected ratio, calculated as the number of unique providers seen by MA beneficiaries divided by the number expected based on the prediction model. We assessed the relationship between network restrictiveness and market factors across specialties with multivariable linear regression. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION

methodsPrescription drug event data for a 20% random sample of beneficiaries enrolled in prescription drug coverage from 2011 to 2017. PRINCIPAL

findingsProvider networks in MA varied in restrictiveness. OB-Gynecology was the most restrictive with enrollees seeing 34.5% (95% CI: 34.3%-34.7%) as many providers as they would absent network restrictions; cardiology was the least restrictive with enrollees seeing 58.6% (95% CI: 58.4%-58.8%) as many providers as they otherwise would. Factors associated with less restrictive networks included the county-level TM average hierarchical condition category score (0.06; 95% CI: 0.04-0.07), the county-level number of doctors per 1000 population (0.04; 95% CI: 0.02-0.05), the natural log of local median household income (0.03; 95% CI: 0.007-0.05), and the parent company's market share in the county (0.16; 95% CI: 0.13-0.18). Rurality was a major predictor of more restrictive networks (-0.28; 95% CI: -0.32 to -0.24).

conclusionsOur findings suggest that rural beneficiaries may face disproportionately reduced access in these networks and that efforts to improve access should vary by specialty.

Indexed as

Medicare Part CAgedFemaleHumansMaleMedicinePhysiciansSpecializationUnited Statesaccess to carehealth policyMedicare Advantageprovider networksregulationspecialists

Identifiers

PMID38594081
PMCPMC11250170
OpenAlexW4394763108

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.