Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38526581›Full record

ArticlePsychological research2024

The illusory certainty: Information repetition and impressions of truth enhance subjective confidence in validity judgments independently of the factual truth.

Annika Stump, Andreas Voss, Jan Rummel

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Psychological research, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
1.0field-weighted citation impact, top 27% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed, 3 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Annika StumpInstitute of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstrasse 47-51, D-69117, Heidelberg, Germany. annika.stump@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de.
Andreas VossInstitute of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstrasse 47-51, D-69117, Heidelberg, Germany.
Jan RummelInstitute of Psychology, Heidelberg University, Hauptstrasse 47-51, D-69117, Heidelberg, Germany.
Heidelberg University · DE

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

People not only judge repeatedly perceived information as more likely being true (the so-called truth effect) they also tend to be more confident after judging the validity of repeated information. These phenomena are assumed to be caused by a higher subjective feeling of ease (i.e., fluency) when processing repeated (vs. new) information. Based on the suggestion that a higher number of coherent mental activations is promoting a fluency experience, we argue that besides repetition an already existing information network, that is (nonspecific) prior knowledge, can enhance fluency. Following this argumentation, information repetition as well as the act of judging incoming information as being true (vs. false) should feed into subjective confidence - independently of the factual truth (when judging under uncertainty). To test this, we reanalyzed two published data sets and conducted a new study. In total, participants (N = 247) gave 29,490 truth judgments and corresponding ratings of subjective confidence while attending two judgement phases (i.e., 10 min and 1 week after the exposure phase in each experiment). Results showed that (a) repetition (in 3 of 3 data sets) and (b) impressions of truth (in 2 of 3 data sets) were systematically related to higher subjective confidence. Moreover, we found (c) a significant positive interaction between repetition and impressions of truth after both intervals in all data sets. Our analyses further underline the moderating effect of time: Influences of repetition significantly decreased with increasing time interval. Notably, the factual truth did not systematically affect any of the above reported effects.

Indexed as

JudgmentAdolescentAdultFemaleHumansMaleUncertaintyYoung AdultInformation repetitionProcessing fluencyRetention interval lengthSubjective confidenceTruth judgments

Identifiers

PMID38526581
PMCPMC11143013
OpenAlexW4393162429

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.