Protecting FPGA-Based Cryptohardware Implementations from Fault Attacks Using ADCs.

The majority of data exchanged between connected devices are confidential and must be protected against unauthorized access. To ensure data protection, so-called cryptographic algorithms are used. These algorithms have proven to be mathematically secure against brute force due to the key length, but their physical implementations are vulnerable against physical attacks. The physical implementation of these algorithms can result in the disclosure of information that can be used to access confidential data. Some of the most powerful hardware attacks presented in the literature are called fault injection attacks. These attacks involve introducing a malfunction into the normal operation of the device and then analyzing the data obtained by comparing them with the expected behavior. Some of the most common methods for injecting faults are the variation of the supply voltage and temperature or the injection of electromagnetic pulses. In this paper, a hardware design methodology using analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) is presented to detect attacks on cryptocircuits and prevent information leakage during fault injection attacks. To assess the effectiveness of the proposed design approach, FPGA-based ADC modules were designed that detect changes in temperature and supply voltage. Two setups were implemented to test the scheme against voltage and temperature variations and injections of electromagnetic pulses. The results obtained demonstrate that, in 100% of the cases, when the correct operating voltage and temperature range were established, the detectors could activate an alarm signal when the cryptographic module was attacked, thus avoiding confidential information leakage and protecting data from being exploited.