ReviewHeliyon2024
Decision model for binary safety management behavior in a supply chain under digital scenarios: A study based on differential game theory.
Review in Heliyon, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
0 citing papers in PubMed.
No citing paper in PubMed yet.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to expand and deepen research in the field of safety production, explore the role of enterprises as decision-making entities in safety production, analyze the role of different types of decision-making behaviors in the process of enterprise safety production, and provide certain theoretical guidance for multi-agent decision-making in safety production. By summarizing and comparing the existing dual system of supply chain safety management, this study proposes dividing supply chain safety management into the two categories of safety organization and safety research and development (safety R&D) in the context of digitalization. Differential equations are established to describe a two-level supply chain safety management problem including manufacturers and suppliers. The research results show that, compared with the Nash equilibrium, when there are strong manufacturers involved in safety management cooperation, the manufacturer's safety R&D subsidy to suppliers improves the total revenue of the supply chain. When the manufacturer's safety organization supervision efficiency is high, the Stackelberg equilibrium is lower. It is a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer to supervise the supplier's safety organization to the Nash equilibrium. In the case of dual safety cooperation in the supply chain, when there are strong manufacturers, R&D subsidies have a crowding out effect on the safety organization cooperation. Finally, based on the example analysis, relevant suggestions are put forward for supply chain safety management.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.