Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38433989›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in digital health2024

When all computers shut down: the clinical impact of a major cyber-attack on a general hospital.

Benyamine Abbou, Boris Kessel, Merav Ben Natan, Rinat Gabbay-Benziv, Dikla Dahan Shriki, Anna Ophir, Nimrod Goldschmid, Adi Klein, Ariel Roguin, Mickey Dudkiewicz

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in digital health, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

Benyamine Abbou *Hospital Administration, Hillel Yaffe Medical Center, Hadera, Israel.
Boris Kessel *Ruth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.
Merav Ben NatanPat Matthews Academic School of Nursing, Hillel Yaffe Medical Center, Hadera, Israel.
Rinat Gabbay-BenzivRuth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.
Dikla Dahan ShrikiSurgical Division, Hillel Yaffe Medical Center, Hadera, Israel.
Anna OphirRuth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.
Nimrod GoldschmidRuth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.
Adi KleinRuth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.
Ariel Roguin *Ruth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel.
Mickey Dudkiewicz *Hospital Administration, Hillel Yaffe Medical Center, Hadera, Israel.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Importance: Healthcare organizations operate in a data-rich environment and depend on digital computerized systems; thus, they may be exposed to cyber threats. Indeed, one of the most vulnerable sectors to hacks and malware is healthcare. However, the impact of cyberattacks on healthcare organizations remains under-investigated. Objective: This study aims to describe a major attack on an entire medical center that resulted in a complete shutdown of all computer systems and to identify the critical actions required to resume regular operations. Setting: This study was conducted on a public, general, and acute care referral university teaching hospital. Methods: We report the different recovery measures on various hospital clinical activities and their impact on clinical work. Results: The system malfunction of hospital computers did not reduce the number of heart catheterizations, births, or outpatient clinic visits. However, a sharp drop in surgical activities, emergency room visits, and total hospital occupancy was observed immediately and during the first postattack week. A gradual increase in all clinical activities was detected starting in the second week after the attack, with a significant increase of 30% associated with the restoration of the electronic medical records (EMR) and laboratory module and a 50% increase associated with the return of the imaging module archiving. One limitation of the present study is that, due to its retrospective design, there were no data regarding the number of elective internal care hospitalizations that were considered crucial. Conclusions and relevance: The risk of ransomware cyberattacks is growing. Healthcare systems at all levels of the hospital should be aware of this threat and implement protocols should this catastrophic event occur. Careful evaluation of steady computer system recovery weekly enables vital hospital function, even under a major cyberattack. The restoration of EMR, laboratory systems, and imaging archiving modules was found to be the most significant factor that allowed the return to normal clinical hospital work.

Indexed as

computer securitycomputers in medicinecyberattackhealthcare system resiliencepatient electronic fileransomwaresafety

Identifiers

PMID38433989
PMCPMC10904636

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.