Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38422012›Full record

ArticlePloS one2024

The signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game: Experimental evidence from the laboratory.

Chi-Hsiang Liu, Shih-Feng Tsai, Ting-Cih Chen, Hsiu-Wen Cheng

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Chi-Hsiang LiuSchool of Economic and Trade, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan, China.ORCID 0000-0003-1439-2423
Shih-Feng TsaiSchool of Economic and Trade, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan, China.
Ting-Cih ChenDepartment of Economics and Finance, Ming Chuan University, Taoyuan City, Taiwan.
Hsiu-Wen ChengTaiwan Youth Employment Demonstration Site of Hubei University of Economics, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game. To eliminate the potential impact of feedback's informative function, we test whether the provision of detailed yet redundant feedback leads to increased contributions. Our findings demonstrate that redundant information significantly promotes contributions. Given the equal informative power in both treatments, the observed increase in contributions can be attributed to the signaling effect. Furthermore, an examination of cooperative disposition heterogeneity reveals that conditional cooperators primarily utilize feedback for its informative function, while free riders primarily exploit it for its signaling function. These results offer empirical evidence of the signaling function of feedback and offer valuable insights into the design of feedback provision in repeated public goods settings.

Indexed as

LaboratoriesSignal TransductionFeedback

Identifiers

PMID38422012
PMCPMC10903900

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.