Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38418329›Full record

ReviewTrends in biotechnology2024

Cryptographic approaches to authenticating synthetic DNA sequences.

Casey-Tyler Berezin, Samuel Peccoud, Diptendu M Kar, Jean Peccoud

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Trends in biotechnology, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Cyber-biological convergence: a systematic review and future outlook.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2024
    Pooled it
  2. Review
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Self-documenting plasmids.Trends in biotechnology · 2025
    Review
  9. Article
  10. Review
  11. Article
  12. Sequencing Strategy to Ensure Accurate Plasmid Assembly.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2024
    Article
  13. Synsor: a tool for alignment-free detection of engineered DNA sequences.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Casey-Tyler BerezinDepartment of Chemical & Biological Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA.
Samuel PeccoudDepartment of Electrical Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA.
Diptendu M KarDepartment of Computer Sciences, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA.
Jean PeccoudDepartment of Chemical & Biological Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA; Department of Computer Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA; School of Biomedical Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA; Department of Systems Engineering, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA. Electronic address: jean.peccoud@colostate.edu.

Funding

Predoctoral Training in Quantitative Cell & Molecular BiologyT32GM132057 · NIGMS · COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY · PI Karen Marie Dobos, Brian Munsky · 2019 to 2026
$2.9M
Supplement: Development of a technology to certify engineered DNA moleculesR01GM147816 · NIGMS · COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY · PI PECCOUD, JEAN M · 2022 to 2024
$1.4M
Leveraging cytoplasmic transcription to develop self-amplifying DNA vaccinesR21AI168482 · NIAID · COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY · PI PECCOUD, JEAN M · 2023 to 2024
$400k
NIAID NIH HHS R21 AI168482NIGMS NIH HHS R01 GM147816NIGMS NIH HHS T32 GM132057
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In a bioeconomy that relies on synthetic DNA sequences, the ability to ensure their authenticity is critical. DNA watermarks can encode identifying data in short sequences and can be combined with error correction and encryption protocols to ensure that sequences are robust to errors and securely communicated. New digital signature techniques allow for public verification that a sequence has not been modified and can contain sufficient information for synthetic DNA to be self-documenting. In translating these techniques from bacteria to more complex genetically modified organisms (GMOs), special considerations must be made to allow for public verification of these products. We argue that these approaches should be widely implemented to assert authorship, increase the traceability, and detect the unauthorized use of synthetic DNA.

Indexed as

DNAComputer SecurityOrganisms, Genetically ModifiedSynthetic BiologyDNAcyberbiosecuritydigital signatureDNA cryptographyDNA watermarkgenetic engineering attribution

Identifiers

PMID38418329
PMCPMC11309913

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.