Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38392855›Full record

ArticlePathogens (Basel, Switzerland)2024

Establishment of a Poliovirus Containment Program and Containment Certification Process for Poliovirus-Essential Facilities, United States 2017-2022.

Christy Ottendorfer, Bryan Shelby, Cecelia A Sanders, Anna Llewellyn, Christy Myrick, Christye Brown, Suganthi Suppiah, Kortney Gustin, Lia Haynes Smith

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Pathogens (Basel, Switzerland), 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Christy OttendorferCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Readiness and Response, U.S. National Authority for Containment of Poliovirus, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
Bryan ShelbyCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Readiness and Response, U.S. National Authority for Containment of Poliovirus, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
Cecelia A SandersCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Readiness and Response, U.S. National Authority for Containment of Poliovirus, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.ORCID 0000-0002-7395-7335
Anna LlewellynCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-6712-7477
Christy MyrickCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Laboratory Science and Safety, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
Christye BrownMorehouse School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA 30310, USA.
Suganthi SuppiahCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Readiness and Response, U.S. National Authority for Containment of Poliovirus, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
Kortney GustinCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Readiness and Response, U.S. National Authority for Containment of Poliovirus, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.
Lia Haynes SmithCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Readiness and Response, U.S. National Authority for Containment of Poliovirus, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Upon declaration of poliovirus (PV) type 2 eradication in 2015, the World Health Organization (WHO) published PV containment requirements in the Global Action Plan III (GAPIII) for mitigating the risk of a facility-associated release post eradication. In 2018, the 71st World Health Assembly resolution urged member states retaining PV to appoint a National Authority for Containment (NAC), reduce the number of PV facilities, and submit applications for containment certification. The United States (US) NAC was established in 2018 for containment oversight, and two paths to WHO GAPIII containment certification were developed. Facilities retaining PV were identified through national poliovirus containment surveys. The US NAC conducted 27 site visits at 18 facilities (20 laboratories: A/BSL-2 (65%), A/BSL-3 (20%), and storage-only (15%)) to verify the implementation of US NAC's preliminary containment measures. The NAC identified areas for improvement in seven categories: primary containment, decontamination, hand hygiene, security, emergency response, training, and immunization practices. Sixteen facility applications were endorsed to pursue poliovirus-essential facility (PEF) certification, whereas four facilities opted to withdraw during the containment certification process. The US made noteworthy progress in PV containment to enhance biosafety and biosecurity practices at US PV facilities to safeguard the polio eradication effort.

Indexed as

CertificationDisease EradicationPoliomyelitisPoliovirusContainment of BiohazardsHumansLaboratoriesUnited StatesWorld Health OrganizationGAPIIINACPEFpoliopoliovirus containmentpoliovirus-essential facility

Identifiers

PMID38392855
PMCPMC10893385

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.