Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38384376›Full record

ArticleThe American economic review2022

The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance.

Marika Cabral, Can Cui, Michael Dworsky

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The American economic review, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Marika CabralUniversity of Texas at Austin Department of Economics and NBER.
Can CuiIndependent Researcher.
Michael DworskyRAND Corporation.

Funding

Scientific & Technical CoreP2CHD042849 · NICHD · UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN · PI Elizabeth T. Gershoff · 2017 to 2026
$5.2M
NICHD NIH HHS P2C HD042849
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure-such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities-may not justify a mandate in this setting.

Indexed as

G52J28JEL G22K13K31

Identifiers

PMID38384376
PMCPMC10881117

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceTDM
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.