ArticleThe journal of ethics2024
A Scalar Approach to Vaccination Ethics.
Article in The journal of ethics, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed.
- Misinformation, Freedom of Expression and Mandatory Vaccination.Public health ethics · 2026Article
- Scope and Spatio-Temporal Patterns of Workplace Vaccination Mandates During the COVID-19 Pandemic.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2025Article
- Should governments moralize health?Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · 2025Article
- The Increasing Influence of Big Tech in Health and Medicine and the Need for a Public Health Ethics Perspective.Public health ethics · 2025Article
- Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination in the Health Sector: a Comparative Approach Between the Greek and American Examples.Health care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy · 2025Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Should people get vaccinated for the sake of others? What could ground-and limit-the normative claim that people ought to do so? In this paper, we propose a reasons-based consequentialist account of vaccination for the benefit of others. We outline eight harm-based and probabilistic factors that, we argue, give people moral reasons to get vaccinated. Instead of understanding other-directed vaccination in terms of binary moral duties (i.e., where people either have or do not have a moral duty to get vaccinated), we develop a scalar approach according to which people can have stronger or weaker moral reasons to get vaccinated in view of the moral good of vaccination. One advantage of our approach is that it can capture why a person might have strong moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine A, but only weak moral reasons to get vaccinated with Vaccine B. We discuss theoretical strengths of our approach and provide a case study of vaccination against COVID-19 to demonstrate its practical significance.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.