Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38356579›Full record

ArticleHeliyon2024

Research on the mechanism of government-industry-university-research collaboration for cultivating innovative talent based on game theory.

Jianlong Ma, Dongsheng Yang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Heliyon, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Jianlong MaChongqing Finance and Economics College, China.
Dongsheng YangChongqing Finance and Economics College, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The assessment of colleges' effectiveness heavily relies on the employment status of graduates. Government-industry-university-research (GIUR) collaboration in cultivation talent is the key to improving the employment rate of college graduates. Based on the theoretical framework of the triple helix, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model that encompasses government, enterprises, and university research institutions. The research findings indicate (1) the evolutionary convergence of strategies among the subjects of the three-party game. (2) The attainment of a stable ideal evolution state for (1,1,1) is possible when the requisite conditions are met. This suggests that the cultivation of aligned talent in GIUR collaborations should coordinate the interests of various stakeholders. (3) Drawing inspiration from parameter-sensitive simulation, the problem of mismatch between talent cultivation and social demand can be effectively addressed through measures such as reducing the cost of cooperation, balancing the distribution of benefits, and implementing appropriate reward and punishment mechanisms. In response to these implications, we put forward some management insights and suggestions.

Indexed as

Government-industry-university-researchTalent cultivationTripartite game

Identifiers

PMID38356579
PMCPMC10864900

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.