Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38341499›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2024

Detection and isolation of wormhole nodes in wireless ad hoc networks based on post-wormhole actions.

David Samuel Bhatti, Shahzad Saleem, Azhar Imran, Hyeon Jeong Kim, Ki-Il Kim, Kyu-Chul Lee

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

David Samuel BhattiFaculty of Information Technology, University of Central Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
Shahzad SaleemDepartment of Cybersecurity, College of Computer Science and Engineering, Jeddah University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
Azhar ImranDepartment of Creative Technologies, Faculty of Computing & A.I., Air University, Islamabad, 42000, Pakistan.
Hyeon Jeong KimDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, Chungnam National University, Daejeon, 34134, Korea.
Ki-Il KimDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, Chungnam National University, Daejeon, 34134, Korea. kikim@cnu.ac.kr.
Kyu-Chul LeeDepartment of Computer Science and Engineering, Chungnam National University, Daejeon, 34134, Korea. kclee@cnu.ac.kr.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The wormhole attack is one of the most treacherous attacks projected at the routing layer that can bypass cryptographic measures and derail the entire communication network. It is too difficult to prevent a priori; all the possible countermeasures are either too expensive or ineffective. Indeed, literature solutions either require expensive hardware (typically UWB or secure GPS transceivers) or pose specific constraints to the adversarial behavior (doing or not doing a suspicious action). The proposed solution belongs to the second category because the adversary is assumed to have done one or more known suspicious actions. In this solution, we adopt a heuristic approach to detect wormholes in ad hoc networks based on the detection of their illicit behaviors. Wormhole and post wormhole attacks are often confused in literature; that's why we clearly state that our methodology does not provide a defence against wormholes, but rather against the actions that an adversary does after the wormhole, such as packet dropping, tampering with TTL, replaying and looping, etc. In terms of contributions, the proposed solution addresses the knock-out capability of attackers that is less targeted by the researcher's community. In addition, it neither requires any additional hardware nor a change in it; instead, it is compatible with the existing network stack. The idea is simulated in ns2.30, and the average detection rate of the proposed solution is found to be 98-99%. The theoretical time to detect a wormhole node lies between 0.07-0.71 seconds. But, from the simulation, the average detection and isolation time is 0.67 seconds. In term of packet loss, the proposed solution has a relatively overhead of [Formula: see text] 22%. It works well in static and mobile scenarios, but the frame losses are higher in mobile scenarios as compared to static ones. The computational complexity of the solution is O(n). Simulation results advocate that the solution is effective in terms of memory, processing, bandwidth, and energy cost. The solution is validated using statistical parameters such as Accuracy, Precision, F1-Score and Matthews correlation coefficient ([Formula: see text]).

Indexed as

Detection rateMANET attacksMatthews correlation coefficientMemory and processing costsMessaging overheadPacket loss and delivery ratioWormhole detection and isolation

Identifiers

PMID38341499
PMCPMC10858888

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.