Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38339700›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2024

Detection of Malicious Threats Exploiting Clock-Gating Hardware Using Machine Learning.

Nuri Alperen Kose, Razaq Jinad, Amar Rasheed, Narasimha Shashidhar, Mohamed Baza, Hani Alshahrani

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Nuri Alperen KoseDepartment of Computer Science, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77340, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-8328-0631
Razaq JinadDepartment of Computer Science, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77340, USA.
Amar RasheedDepartment of Computer Science, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77340, USA.
Narasimha ShashidharDepartment of Computer Science, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77340, USA.
Mohamed BazaDepartment of Computer Science, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC 29424, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-5153-8693
Hani AlshahraniDepartment of Computer Science, College of Computer Science and Information Systems, Najran University, Najran 61441, Saudi Arabia.ORCID 0000-0002-8799-9448

Funding

Najran University NU/RG/SERC/12/27
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Embedded system technologies are increasingly being incorporated into manufacturing, smart grid, industrial control systems, and transportation systems. However, the vast majority of today's embedded platforms lack the support of built-in security features which makes such systems highly vulnerable to a wide range of cyber-attacks. Specifically, they are vulnerable to malware injection code that targets the power distribution system of an ARM Cortex-M-based microcontroller chipset (ARM, Cambridge, UK). Through hardware exploitation of the clock-gating distribution system, an attacker is capable of disabling/activating various subsystems on the chip, compromising the reliability of the system during normal operation. This paper proposes the development of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) capable of detecting clock-gating malware deployed on ARM Cortex-M-based embedded systems. To enhance the robustness and effectiveness of our approach, we fully implemented, tested, and compared six IDSs, each employing different methodologies. These include IDSs based on K-Nearest Classifier, Random Forest, Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, Naive Bayes, and Stochastic Gradient Descent. Each of these IDSs was designed to identify and categorize various variants of clock-gating malware deployed on the system. We have analyzed the performance of these IDSs in terms of detection accuracy against various types of clock-gating malware injection code. Power consumption data collected from the chipset during normal operation and malware code injection attacks were used for models' training and validation. Our simulation results showed that the proposed IDSs, particularly those based on K-Nearest Classifier and Logistic Regression, were capable of achieving high detection rates, with some reaching a detection rate of 0.99. These results underscore the effectiveness of our IDSs in protecting ARM Cortex-M-based embedded systems against clock-gating malware.

Indexed as

ARM cortexembedded systemsintrusion detectionmachine learningmalware

Identifiers

PMID38339700
PMCPMC10856995

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.