A conceptional game theory analysis of environmental public interest litigation of China.

China introduced civil and administrative public interest litigation (PIL) through a series of pilot projects and legislative revisions in recent years. Now a procuratorate has the standing to bring civil PIL cases against polluters and administrative PIL cases against administrative agencies in its jurisdictions while a qualified non-governmental organization (NGO) has no geographic limits and may bring civil PIL cases against polluters anywhere in mainland China. Previous literature focused on the use of PIL for redressing environmental damages in individual cases. This paper studies the function of PIL beyond individual cases with game theory. This paper uses data collected through autoethnography, interviews, databases of judgements, statistics, and previous literature. This paper finds that local procuratorates and NGOs brought a large number of environmental PIL cases and changed the behavior patterns of local governments and their environmental protection agencies as well as that of polluters. Before the introduction of PIL rules, governmental officers of local governments and their environmental protection agencies were more discretionary and selective in environmental law enforcement and were more cooperative with polluters. After the law introduced PIL rules, they are now less discretionary in environmental law enforcement, less cooperative with polluters, and more likely to strictly enforce the environmental law. This paper models the interaction between local governments and polluters before the introduction of environmental PIL as an infinitely repeated game and reveals the ensuing cooperation. This infinitely repeated game was broken by new players introduced by the PIL, i.e., the procuratorate, NGOs, and the court, which changed the behavior patterns of the local government and its environmental protection agencies as well as that of polluters. This paper concludes that the function of PIL beyond individual cases lies in that it breaks the chain of infinitely repeated game between the local government and polluters and thus changes their behavior patterns.