After the trans brain: a critique of the neurobiological accounts of embodied trans* identities.

This paper critically analyses three main neurobiological hypotheses on trans* identities: the neurobiological theory about the origin of gender dysphoria, the neurodevelopmental cortical hypothesis, and the alternative hypothesis of self-referential thinking and body perception. In this study I focus then the attention on three elements: the issue of (de)pathologisation, the idea of the trans brain, and the aetiology of trans* identities. While the neurobiological theory about the origin of gender dysphoria and the neurodevelopmental cortical hypothesis claim the existence of the trans brain, each offering its own neurobiological depiction, the hypothesis of self-referential thinking and body perception doesn't postulate a distinctive neurobiological trait for all trans* people. I problematize both portrayals of the trans brain departing from the findings and conceptualizations of the paradigm shifting brain mosaicism. Unlike the hypothesis of self-referential thinking and body perception that keeps the question of causation open, both the neurobiological theory about the origin of gender dysphoria and the neurodevelopmental cortical hypothesis situate the origin of trans* identities in the neurobiological domain. I challenge the biological deterministic framework in which this aetiology is inscribed from a dynamic processual entanglement perspective. Finally, concerning the issue of (de)pathologisation of trans* identities, an evolution can be seen in each of the hypothesis and among them, from the least to the most depathologising. However, I question their complete departure from a pathologising framework.