Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38287244›Full record

ArticleBMC infectious diseases2024

Emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in Canada: a retrospective analysis from clinical and wastewater data.

David Champredon, Devan Becker, Shelley W Peterson, Edgard Mejia, Nikho Hizon, Andrea Schertzer, Mohamed Djebli, Femi F Oloye, Yuwei Xie, Mohsen Asadi and 8 more

Abstract read
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in BMC infectious diseases, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

18 authors.

David ChampredonPublic Health Agency of Canada, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Risk Sciences Division, Guelph, ON, Canada. david.champredon@Canada.ca.
Devan BeckerPublic Health Agency of Canada, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Risk Sciences Division, Guelph, ON, Canada.
Shelley W PetersonPublic Health Agency of Canada, National Microbiology Laboratory, One Health Division, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
Edgard MejiaPublic Health Agency of Canada, National Microbiology Laboratory, One Health Division, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
Nikho HizonPublic Health Agency of Canada, National Microbiology Laboratory, One Health Division, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
Andrea SchertzerPublic Health Agency of Canada, Centre for Immunization and Respiratory Infectious Diseases, Ottawa, ON, Canada.
Mohamed DjebliPublic Health Agency of Canada, Centre for Immunization and Respiratory Infectious Diseases, Ottawa, ON, Canada.
Femi F OloyeToxicology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada. pen2crown@yahoo.com.
Yuwei XieToxicology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
Mohsen AsadiDepartment of Civil, Geological and Environmental Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
Jenna CantinToxicology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
Xia PuToxicology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
Charles A OsunlaToxicology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
Markus BrinkmannToxicology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
Kerry N McPhedranDepartment of Civil, Geological and Environmental Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada.
Mark R ServosDepartment of Biology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada.
John P GiesyToxicology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada. jgiesy@aol.com.
Chand MangatPublic Health Agency of Canada, National Microbiology Laboratory, One Health Division, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe spread of SARS-CoV-2 has been studied at unprecedented levels worldwide. In jurisdictions where molecular analysis was performed on large scales, the emergence and competition of numerous SARS-CoV-2lineages have been observed in near real-time. Lineage identification, traditionally performed from clinical samples, can also be determined by sampling wastewater from sewersheds serving populations of interest. Variants of concern (VOCs) and SARS-CoV-2 lineages associated with increased transmissibility and/or severity are of particular interest.

methodHere, we consider clinical and wastewater data sources to assess the emergence and spread of VOCs in Canada retrospectively.

resultsWe show that, overall, wastewater-based VOC identification provides similar insights to the surveillance based on clinical samples. Based on clinical data, we observed synchrony in VOC introduction as well as similar emergence speeds across most Canadian provinces despite the large geographical size of the country and differences in provincial public health measures.

conclusionIn particular, it took approximately four months for VOC Alpha and Delta to contribute to half of the incidence. In contrast, VOC Omicron achieved the same contribution in less than one month. This study provides significant benchmarks to enhance planning for future VOCs, and to some extent for future pandemics caused by other pathogens, by quantifying the rate of SARS-CoV-2 VOCs invasion in Canada.

Indexed as

COVID-19CanadaHumansRetrospective StudiesSARS-CoV-2WastewaterWastewaterClinical samples: OmicronLineage identificationMolecular analysisSARS-CoV-2lineagesVariant of concernWastewater-based epidemiology

Identifiers

PMID38287244
PMCPMC10823614

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.