ArticlePhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2024
Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation.
Article in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 9 citations in OpenAlex.
- The evolution of identity signals for co-ordination in diverse societies.Evolutionary human sciences · 2026Article
- Increased complexity of social category markers leads to diverse rule-based categorizations and reduced intergroup bias.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2025Article
- Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Jeans and language: kin networks and reproductive success are associated with the adoption of outgroup norms.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Social norm change: drivers and consequences.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Mechanisms of social control reinforce norms that appear harmful or wasteful, such as mutilation practises or extensive body tattoos. We suggest such norms arise to serve as signals that distinguish between ingroup 'friends' and outgroup 'foes', facilitating parochial cooperation. Combining insights from research on signalling and parochial cooperation, we incorporate a trust game with signalling in an agent-based model to study the dynamics of signalling norm emergence in groups with conflicting interests. Our results show that costly signalling norms emerge from random acts of signalling in minority groups that benefit most from parochial cooperation. Majority groups are less likely to develop costly signalling norms. Yet, norms that prescribe sending costless group identity signals can easily emerge in groups of all sizes-albeit, at times, at the expense of minority group members. Further, the dynamics of signalling norm emergence differ across signal costs, relative group sizes, and levels of ingroup assortment. Our findings provide theoretical insights into norm evolution in contexts where groups develop identity markers in response to environmental challenges that put their interests at odds with the interests of other groups. Such contexts arise in zones of ethnic conflict or during contestations of existing power relations. This article is part of the theme issue 'Social norm change: drivers and consequences'.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.