Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38219274›Full record

ArticleThe Milbank quarterly2024

Mapping the Lobbying Footprint of Harmful Industries: 23 Years of Data From OpenSecrets.

Holly Chung, Katherine Cullerton, Jennifer Lacy-Nichols

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The Milbank quarterly, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 12 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
12citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

12 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Holly ChungCentre for Health Policy, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, The University of Melbourne.
Katherine CullertonSchool of Public Health, The University of Queensland.ORCID 0000-0001-9517-6380
Jennifer Lacy-NicholsCentre for Health Policy, Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, The University of Melbourne.ORCID 0000-0002-5157-2098

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Policy Points Our research reveals the similarities and differences among the lobbying activities of tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and ultraprocessed food industries, which are often a barrier to the implementation of public health policies. Over 23 years, we found that just six organizations dominated lobbying expenses in the tobacco and alcohol sectors, whereas the gambling sector outsourced most of their lobbying to professional firms. Databases like OpenSecrets are a useful resource to monitor the commercial determinants of health. CONTEXT: Commercial lobbying is often a barrier to the development and implementation of public health policies. Yet, little is known about the similarities and differences in the lobbying practices of different industry sectors or types of commercial actors. This study compares the lobbying practices of four industry sectors that have been the focus of much public health research and advocacy: tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and ultraprocessed foods.

methodsData on lobbying expenditures and lobbyist backgrounds were sourced from the OpenSecrets database, which monitors lobbying in the United States. Lobbying expenditure data were analyzed for the 1998-2020 period. We classified commercial actors as companies or trade associations. We used Power BI software to link, analyze, and visualize data sets.

findingsWe found that the ultraprocessed food industry spent the most on lobbying ($1.15 billion), followed by gambling ($817 million), tobacco ($755 million), and alcohol ($541 million). Overall, companies were more active than trade associations, with associations being least active in the tobacco industry. Spending was often highly concentrated, with two organizations accounting for almost 60% of tobacco spending and four organizations accounting for more than half of alcohol spending. Lobbyists that had formerly worked in government were mainly employed by third-party lobby firms.

conclusionsOur study shows how comparing the lobbying practices of different industry sectors offers a deeper appreciation of the diversity and similarities of commercial actors. Understanding these patterns can help public health actors to develop effective counterstrategies.

Indexed as

IndustryLobbyingFood IndustryPublic PolicyUnited Statescommercial determinants of healthcorporate political activityharmful industrieslobbyingUnited States

Identifiers

PMID38219274
PMCPMC10938928

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.