Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38218668›Full record

SynthesisVaccine2024

Trade-offs of different poliovirus vaccine options for outbreak response in the United States and other countries that only use inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization.

Kimberly M Thompson, Dominika A Kalkowska, Sarah E Kidd, Cara C Burns, Kamran Badizadegan

Open access · greenAbstract readSystematic Review
In one paragraph

Synthesis in Vaccine, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
1.2field-weighted citation impact, top 21% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 3 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.

Kimberly M ThompsonKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA. Electronic address: kimt@kidrisk.org.
Dominika A KalkowskaKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA.
Sarah E KiddDivision of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Cara C BurnsDivision of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Kamran BadizadeganKid Risk, Inc., Orlando, FL, USA.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention · USKidney Research UK · GB

Funding

Intramural CDC HHS NU2RGH001915
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Delays in achieving polio eradication have led to ongoing risks of poliovirus importations that may cause outbreaks in polio-free countries. Because of the low, but non-zero risk of paralysis with oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs), countries that achieve and maintain high national routine immunization coverage have increasingly shifted to exclusive use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) for all preventive immunizations. However, immunization coverage within countries varies, with under-vaccinated subpopulations potentially able to sustain transmission of imported polioviruses and experience local outbreaks. Due to its cost, ease-of-use, and ability to induce mucosal immunity, using OPV as an outbreak control measure offers a more cost-effective option in countries in which OPV remains in use. However, recent polio outbreaks in IPV-only countries raise questions about whether and when IPV use for outbreak response may fail to stop poliovirus transmission and what consequences may follow from using OPV for outbreak response in these countries. We systematically reviewed the literature to identify modeling studies that explored the use of IPV for outbreak response in IPV-only countries. In addition, applying a model of the 2022 type 2 poliovirus outbreak in New York, we characterized the implications of using different OPV formulations for outbreak response instead of IPV. We also explored the hypothetical scenario of the same outbreak except for type 1 poliovirus instead of type 2. We find that using IPV for outbreak response will likely only stop outbreaks for polioviruses of relatively low transmission potential in countries with very high overall immunization coverage, seasonal transmission dynamics, and only if IPV immunization interventions reach some unvaccinated individuals. Using OPV for outbreak response in IPV-only countries poses substantial risks and challenges that require careful consideration, but may represent an option to consider for some outbreaks in some populations depending on the properties of the available vaccines and coverage attainable.

Indexed as

Disease OutbreaksPoliomyelitisPoliovirus Vaccine, InactivatedPoliovirus Vaccine, OralDisease EradicationHumansImmunization ProgramsPoliovirusUnited StatesVaccinationVaccination CoveragePoliovirus Vaccine, InactivatedPoliovirus Vaccine, OralDynamic modelingEradicationOutbreak responsePolioPoliovirus

Identifiers

PMID38218668
PMCPMC10947589
OpenAlexW4390862224

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceTDM
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.