Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38074421›Full record

ArticleAnnual review of criminology2023

Surveillance Technologies and Constitutional Law.

Christopher Slobogin, Sarah Brayne

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Annual review of criminology, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Christopher SloboginVanderbilt Law School, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, USA.
Sarah BrayneDepartment of Sociology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, USA.

Funding

Scientific & Technical CoreP2CHD042849 · NICHD · UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN · PI Elizabeth T. Gershoff · 2017 to 2026
$5.2M
NICHD NIH HHS P2C HD042849
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This review focuses on government use of technology to observe, collect, or record potential criminal activity in real-time, as contrasted with "transaction surveillance" that involves government efforts to access already-existing reviews (Brayne 2018, Ridgeway 2018). Even so limited, surveillance technologies come in many guises, including closed-circuit television, automated license plate and facial readers, aerial cameras, and GPS tracking. Also classifiable as surveillance technology are devices such as thermal and electromagnetic imagers that can "see" through walls and clothing. Finally, surveillance includes wiretapping and other forms of communication interception. The following discussion briefly examines the limited evidence we have about the prevalence and effectiveness of these technologies and then describes the law governing surveillance, focusing principally on constitutional doctrine, and how it might-and might not-limit use of these technologies in the future.

Indexed as

constitutional lawcrimeFourth Amendmentsearchsurveillancetechnology

Identifiers

PMID38074421
PMCPMC10704392

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.