Evidence map›Paper›PMID 38066357›Full record

ArticlePharmacoEconomics2024

A Framework for the Fair Pricing of Medicines.

Mike Paulden

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PharmacoEconomics, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
14citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

14 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
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  3. Exploring the consequences of including off-patent prices in reimbursement decisions for patented drugs.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Mike PauldenSchool of Public Health, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. paulden@ualberta.ca.ORCID 0000-0002-0381-5980

Funding

CIHR 435188
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

As high-cost medicines put increasing pressure on public health care budgets, the need to identify 'fair' prices for medicines has never been greater. This paper proposes a framework, built upon fundamental economic principles, that allows for the consideration of 'fair' prices for medicines. The framework incorporates key considerations from conventional supply-side and demand-side approaches for specifying a cost-effectiveness 'threshold', including the health opportunity cost borne by other patients ([Formula: see text]) and society's willingness to pay for marginal improvements in population health ([Formula: see text]). The costs incurred by manufacturers in developing and supplying new medicines are also considered, as are the incentives for manufacturers to strategically price up to any common price per unit of benefit (cost-effectiveness 'threshold') specified by the payer. The framework finds that, at any 'fair' price, a medicine's dynamically calculated incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) lies below [Formula: see text]. When pricing medicines collectively, the framework finds that a common price below [Formula: see text] is required to maximize population health (consumer surplus) or to maximize total welfare (consumer and producer surplus). This framework has important policy implications for payers who wish to improve population health outcomes from constrained health care budgets. In particular, existing approaches to 'value-based pricing' should be reconsidered to ensure that patients receive a 'fair' share of the resulting economic surplus.

Indexed as

Drug CostsHealth Care CostsBudgetsCost-Benefit AnalysisHumans

Identifiers

PMID38066357
PMCPMC10810971

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.