ArticleNature communications2023
Introspective inference counteracts perceptual distortion.
Article in Nature communications, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
6 citing papers in PubMed.
- Towards an integrative neuroscience of metacognition.Nature reviews. Neuroscience · 2026Review
- Refining mechanistic models of hallucinations for enhanced translatability.Translational psychiatry · 2025Review
- Computational and Neuronal Basis of Visual Confidence.Annual review of vision science · 2025Review
- Computational characterization of metacognitive ability in subjective decision-making.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2025Article
- Confidence reports during perceptual decision making dissociate from changes in subjective experience.Communications psychology · 2025Article
- Confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality.Journal of vision · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Introspective agents can recognize the extent to which their internal perceptual experiences deviate from the actual states of the external world. This ability, also known as insight, is critically required for reality testing and is impaired in psychosis, yet little is known about its cognitive underpinnings. We develop a Bayesian modeling framework and a psychophysics paradigm to quantitatively characterize this type of insight while people experience a motion after-effect illusion. People can incorporate knowledge about the illusion into their decisions when judging the actual direction of a motion stimulus, compensating for the illusion (and often overcompensating). Furthermore, confidence, reaction-time, and pupil-dilation data all show signatures consistent with inferential adjustments in the Bayesian insight model. Our results suggest that people can question the veracity of what they see by making insightful inferences that incorporate introspective knowledge about internal distortions.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.