ArticleScientific reports2023
An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public-private partnership incorporating public participation.
Article in Scientific reports, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Balancing quality collaborative supervision and tripartite satisfaction in elderly healthcare public-private partnerships: an evolutionary game and simulation analysis.BMC health services research · 2025Article
- Evolutionary game model for the behavior of private sectors in elderly healthcare public-private partnership under the condition of information asymmetry.BMC health services research · 2025Article
- Evolutionary game analysis of data sharing among large and medium-sized enterprises in the perspective of platform empowerment.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- New energy vehicle battery recycling strategy considering carbon emotion from a closed-loop supply chain perspective.Scientific reports · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
Abstract
This study analyzes the impact of public participation on the choice of third-party evaluators' behavior strategies during the service quality supervision process of China's pension public-private partnership project. An evolutionary game model between third-party evaluators and government regulators is developed, wherein the evolution rule of the two sides and public participation's influence on their behavior under the two different conditions are analyzed, and a numerical simulation is carried out using MATLAB 2016a. It is found that third-party evaluators may choose the false evaluation strategy without public participation because of the inducement of rent-seeking or insufficient government punishment when the regulatory revenue of the government regulatory agencies is less than the regulatory cost. In contrast, in the case of public participation, the true evaluation strategy is chosen with an improvement in the level of public participation or an increase in reputation incentive. This suggests the construction and improvement of a third-party evaluation system, which shows that the construction of the service quality supervision system in China's pension PPP project has a large operating space.
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Registered trials
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