Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37971991›Full record

ArticlePloS one2023

A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of sports data rights protection from the perspective of stakeholder.

Xiaoyu Li, Xinyan Guo

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Xiaoyu LiSchool of Economics and Management, Chengdu Sport University, Chengdu, Sichuan, China.ORCID 0009-0007-8040-3780
Xinyan GuoSchool of Economics and Management, Chengdu Sport University, Chengdu, Sichuan, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The amount of data in the globe is increasing at an exponential rate, and the role of digital technology and data elements in the modern growth of China's sports business is becoming more significant. Disputes over sports data rights have grown in the international arena, with a special focus on how to preserve the sports data rights of key stakeholders. This study begins from the standpoint of stakeholders, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, sports enterprises, and the public around the issue of sports data rights protection, investigates the behavioral evolutionary characteristics of each stakeholder and its stabilization strategies, simulates and analyzes the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the stakeholders in various situations using MATLAB, and proposes a compatible institution. According to the findings of this study, the cost of sports data governance, the cost of sports data sharing, the degree of sports data compliance use, the government incentive system, and the government regulation mechanism are the important elements impacting each stakeholder's behavioral decision-making. Based on the foregoing, the study proposes corresponding institutional strategies for governments to respond to the issue of sports data rights, which will be more conducive to the safe use of data for development and humanitarian action, as well as contribute to global sustainable development.

Indexed as

GovernmentSustainable DevelopmentBiological EvolutionChinaGame TheoryHealth FacilitiesMotivation

Identifiers

PMID37971991
PMCPMC10653474

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.