Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37964880›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in medicine2023

A concept for multi-winner tenders for medicinal products with balancing between efficient prices, long-term competition and sustainability of supply.

Gergely Németh, Mánuel László Mágó, Zoltán Kaló, Judit Lám, Tamás Balogh, Valentin Brodszky

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in medicine, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Gergely NémethData-Driven Health Division of National Laboratory for Health Security, Health Services Management Training Centre, Semmelweis University, Budapest, Hungary.
Mánuel László MágóInstitute of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary.
Zoltán KalóCenter for Health Technology Assessment, Semmelweis University, Budapest, Hungary.
Judit LámData-Driven Health Division of National Laboratory for Health Security, Health Services Management Training Centre, Semmelweis University, Budapest, Hungary.
Tamás BaloghDepartment of Reimbursement, National Institute of Health Insurance Fund Management, Budapest, Hungary.
Valentin BrodszkyDepartment of Health Policy, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Achieving price efficiency via tenders, the sustainability of competition, and the prevention of shortages are hot topics in the debates about shaping the pharmaceutical markets. Single-winner tenders receive growing criticism for concentrating on achieving low prices at the expense of the long-term maintenance of a competitive pharmaceutical industry, the security of continuous supply, and disregarding the therapeutic needs of patient populations with specific conditions. This paper aims at drafting a concept to assist the design of multi-winner tenders for medicinal products with a focus on supply and sales guarantees, price efficiency, and equity in access. The concept shall be generally applicable to all kinds of medicinal products including generics, biosimilars, and on-patent products in the out- and in-patient sector. Principles for multi-winner tenders for medicinal products are set and a number of delimitations are made in order to get rid of factors that prevent clairvoyance amid the various pricing and reimbursement systems when designing a concept. The steps to plan and implement a multi-winner tendering procedure are drafted on the basis of the defined principles. The tender should consist of planning, bidding, preparation, sales, and evaluation phases. Pharmaceutical companies shall make bids with price and quantity pairs, which shall be ranked by prices and if applicable then taking into account other factors. The tenderer shall predefine market shares to the various places of the ranking. A double ceiling shall be applicable for the sales of the winners: their sales must not exceed their quantity offer and the predefined market share applicable to their place in the ranking. The implementation of the concept will require the careful adjustment of the tender conditions to the specificities of the pharmaceutical market concerned on the one hand and to the local pricing and reimbursement system on the other hand.

Indexed as

equity in accessmulti-winner tenderprice efficiencysales guaranteeshortage preventionsupply guarantee

Identifiers

PMID37964880
PMCPMC10642851

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.