Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37950272›Full record

ArticleJournal of pharmaceutical policy and practice2023

Regulatory enforcement of the marketing of fixed-dose combinations in India: a case study of systemic antibiotics.

Petra Brhlikova, Aashna Mehta, Patricia McGettigan, Allyson M Pollock, Peter Roderick, Habib Hasan Farooqui

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of pharmaceutical policy and practice, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Petra BrhlikovaPopulation Health Sciences Institute, Newcastle University, Baddiley-Clark Building, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE2 4AX, UK. pbrhlikova@gmail.com.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2085-0304
Aashna MehtaPublic Health Foundation of India, Gurugram, India.
Patricia McGettiganWilliam Harvey Research Institute, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK.
Allyson M PollockPopulation Health Sciences Institute, Newcastle University, Baddiley-Clark Building, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE2 4AX, UK.
Peter RoderickPopulation Health Sciences Institute, Newcastle University, Baddiley-Clark Building, Newcastle Upon Tyne, NE2 4AX, UK.
Habib Hasan FarooquiCollege of Medicine, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundIn India, states have licensed the manufacture of large numbers of fixed-dose combination (FDC) drugs without the required prior approval of the central regulator. This paper describes two major regulatory initiatives to address the problem, which began in 2007 and 2013, and examines whether they have been sufficient to remove centrally unapproved systemic antibiotic FDCs from the market.

methodsInformation was extracted from documents published by the central regulator and the ministry of health, including the National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM), and court judgments, and analysed alongside sales volume data for 2008-2020 using PharmaTrac market dataset.

resultsThe regulatory initiatives permitted 68 formulations to be given de facto approvals ('No Objection Certificates') outside the statutory regime, banned 46 FDCs and restricted one FDC. Market data show that FDCs as a proportion of total antibiotic sales increased from 32.9 in 2008 to 37.3% in 2020. The total number of antibiotic FDC formulations on the market fell from 574 (2008) to 395 (2020). Formulations with a record of prior central approval increased from 86 (2008) to 94 (2020) and their share of the antibiotic FDC sales increased from 32.0 to 55.3%. In 2020, an additional 23 formulations had been permitted de facto approval, accounting for 10.6% of the antibiotic FDC sales. Even in 2020, most marketed formulations (70.4%, 278/395) were unapproved or banned, and comprised a 15.9% share of the antibiotic FDC sales. The share of NLEM-listed antibiotic FDC sales increased from 21.2 (2008) to 26.7% (2020).

conclusionThe initiatives had limited impact. Regulatory enforcement has been slow and weak, with many unapproved, and even banned, FDCs remaining on the market.

Indexed as

Fixed-dose combination (FDC)IndiaRegulationSystemic antibiotics

Identifiers

PMID37950272
PMCPMC10636890

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.