Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37916977›Full record

ArticlePerspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science2025

Memory of Fictional Information: A Theoretical Framework.

Pierre Gander, Kata Szita, Andreas Falck, Robert Lowe

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Pierre GanderDepartment of Applied Information Technology, University of Gothenburg.ORCID 0000-0002-0214-7511
Kata SzitaTrinity Long Room Hub Arts & Humanities Research Institute, Trinity College Dublin.ORCID 0000-0002-3177-9980
Andreas FalckDepartment of Special Needs Education, University of Oslo.ORCID 0000-0003-3525-2008
Robert LoweDepartment of Applied Information Technology, University of Gothenburg.ORCID 0000-0002-1525-0745

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Much of the information people encounter in everyday life is not factual; it originates from fictional sources, such as movies, novels, and video games, and from direct experience such as pretense, role-playing, and everyday conversation. Despite the recent increase in research on fiction, there is no theoretical account of how memory of fictional information is related to other types of memory or of which mechanisms allow people to separate fact and fiction in memory. We present a theoretical framework that places memory of fiction in relation to other cognitive phenomena as a distinct construct and argue that it is an essential component for any general theory of human memory. We show how fictionality can be integrated in an existing memory model by extending Rubin's dimensional conceptual memory model. By this means, our model can account for explicit and implicit memory of fictional information of events, places, characters, and objects. Further, we propose a set of mechanisms involving various degrees of complexity and levels of conscious processing that mostly keep fact and fiction separated but also allow information from fiction to influence real-world attitudes and beliefs: content-based reasoning, source monitoring, and an associative link from the memory to the concept of fiction.

Indexed as

MemoryModels, PsychologicalHumansfictionfictional informationfictionalityfiction-reality distinctionmechanismsmemory

Identifiers

PMID37916977
PMCPMC11881525

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.