Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37880335›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2023

Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice under government regulation.

Lin Song, Zhenlei Yu, Juntao Fang, Qiang He

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Lin Song *Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Tianjin, 301617, China.
Zhenlei Yu *Information Ministry of Library, Qilu University of Technology, Jinan, 250100, China.
Juntao Fang *Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Tianjin, 301617, China.
Qiang HeTianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Tianjin, 301617, China. heqiang@tjutcm.edu.cn.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Physicians-patients are the two crucial participants in medical malpractice. The government, as the central authority responsible for addressing medical malpractices, plays a pivotal role in this matter. Guided by governmental agencies, its regulations, administrative orders, and policies serve as the primary governance mechanisms to address medical malpractice, providing an effective means to balance the doctor-patient relationship and foster social harmony and stable development. A doctor-patient evolutionary game model developed based on the principles of information asymmetry and finite rationality. The study explores the strategic decision-making process of these two players within the context of medical malpractice. Through the manipulation of various parameters, the model's evolutionary equilibrium strategy is demonstrated using Vensim PLE Version 6.4 simulation. The findings reveal that government regulation, patient cognition, and the benefits associated with standardized medical practices are the pivotal factors influencing the doctor-patient evolutionary game system under government regulation. It is possible to mitigate medical malpractice through adjusting relative weights of differing strategic options, adding penalties for unlawful conduct, and normalizing malpractice charges on the basis of physicians' income from standardized practice. To effectively address medical malpractice, proposed measures include adjusting the regulatory framework, reasonably determining the strength of regulations regarding medical practitioners' illegal practices and patient medical malpractice behavior, diversifying regulatory approaches, establishing comprehensive physician-patient management systems for information to resolve medical malpractices.

Indexed as

MalpracticePhysiciansGame TheoryGovernment RegulationHumansPhysician-Patient Relations

Identifiers

PMID37880335
PMCPMC10600196

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.