ArticlePrimary health care research & development2023
Relational care and epistemic injustice.
Article in Primary health care research & development, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Thwarted credibility work and double binds in medically unexplained pain in Japan: a qualitative study.PEC innovation · 2026Article
- The Gatekeeper's Dilemma: Unpacking the Complexity of Low-Value Care in General Practice.Sociology of health & illness · 2025Article
- 'We Don't Have to Prove to People How We're Feeling': Understanding the Role of Peer Support Groups in Countering Epistemic Injustices in Long COVID at a US Centre.Health expectations : an international journal of public participation in health care and health policy · 2025Article
- "We Were Just so Sad and Devastated": NICU Nurses' Stories of Caring for Families With Substance-Exposed Pregnancies.Nursing inquiry · 2025Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The philosophical underpinnings of primary care have been examined from several perspectives in recent years. In two previous articles, we have argued that a relational view of autonomy is better matched to the primary care setting than others, and that view is mainly formed from the descriptors of its practice. Here we develop that analysis further, linking it to other relevant theory: the experience of human suffering and epistemic injustice. We argue that relational care is fundamental to ameliorating epistemic injustice and that relationships are integral to ethical practice, rather than being distinct. We propose that personalised care as described in the NHS Long Term Plan is not possible without addressing epistemic injustice and therefore without reconsidering our existing normative ethical frameworks.
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What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.