Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37848947›Full record

ArticleBMC health services research2023

A resilient workforce: patient safety and the workforce response to a cyber-attack on the ICT systems of the national health service in Ireland.

Gemma Moore, Zuneera Khurshid, Thérèse McDonnell, Lisa Rogers, Orla Healy

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC health services research, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
3.8field-weighted citation impact, top 7% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 13 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.

Gemma MooreHealth Service Executive, National Quality and Patient Safety Directorate, Dublin, Ireland.
Zuneera KhurshidUCD IRIS Centre, School of Nursing, Midwifery and Health Systems, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
Thérèse McDonnellUCD IRIS Centre, School of Nursing, Midwifery and Health Systems, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland. therese.mcdonnell@ucd.ie.
Lisa RogersUCD IRIS Centre, School of Nursing, Midwifery and Health Systems, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
Orla HealyHealth Service Executive, National Quality and Patient Safety Directorate, Dublin, Ireland.
University College Dublin · IEHealth Service Executive · IE

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundIn May 2021, the Irish public health service was the target of a cyber-attack. The response by the health service resulted in the widespread removal of access to ICT systems. While services including radiology, diagnostics, maternity, and oncology were prioritised for reinstatement, recovery efforts continued for over four months. This study describes the response of health service staff to the loss of ICT systems, and the risk mitigation measures introduced to safely continue health services. The resilience displayed by frontline staff whose rapid and innovative response ensured continuity of safe patient care is explored.

methodsTo gain an in-depth understanding of staff experiences of the cyber-attack, eight focus groups (n = 36) were conducted. Participants from a diverse range of health services were recruited, including staff from radiology, pathology/laboratories, radiotherapy, maternity, primary care dental services, health and wellbeing, COVID testing, older person's care, and disability services. Thematic Analysis was applied to the data to identify key themes.

resultsThe impact of the cyber-attack varied across services depending on the type of care being offered, the reliance on IT systems, and the extent of local IT support. Staff stepped-up to the challenges and quickly developed and implemented innovative solutions, exhibiting great resilience, teamwork and adaptability, with a sharp focus on ensuring patient safety. The cyber-attack resulted in a flattening of the healthcare hierarchy, with shared decision-making at local levels leading to an empowered frontline workforce. However, participants in this study felt the stress placed on staff by the attack was more severe than the cumulative effect of the COVID-19 pandemic.

conclusionsLimited contingencies within the health system IT infrastructure - what we call a lack of system resilience - was compensated for by a resilient workforce. Within the context of the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic, this was an enormous burden on a dedicated workforce. The adverse impact of this attack may have long-term and far-reaching consequences for staff wellbeing. Design and investment in a resilient health system must be prioritised.

Indexed as

COVID-19AgedCOVID-19 TestingFemaleHumansIrelandPandemicsPatient SafetyPregnancyState MedicineWorkforceCyber-attackHealth service staffHealth systemsPatient safetyResilience

Identifiers

PMID37848947
PMCPMC10583305
OpenAlexW4387700061

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.