Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37839050›Full record

ReviewAmerican journal of primatology2025

How can we apply decision-making theories to wild animal behavior? Predictions arising from dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory.

Julie A Teichroeb, Eve A Smeltzer, Virendra Mathur, Karyn A Anderson, Erica J Fowler, Frances V Adams, Eric N Vasey, Ludmila Tamara Kumpan, Samantha M Stead, T Jean M Arseneau-Robar

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in American journal of primatology, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Review
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

Julie A TeichroebDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.ORCID 0000-0002-0908-156X
Eve A SmeltzerDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Virendra MathurDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Karyn A AndersonDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Erica J FowlerDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Frances V AdamsDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Eric N VaseyDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Ludmila Tamara KumpanDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.ORCID 0000-0002-1189-8309
Samantha M SteadDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.ORCID 0000-0002-0899-4973
T Jean M Arseneau-RobarDepartment of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

Funding

Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada RGPIN-2023-03613
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Our understanding of decision-making processes and cognitive biases is ever increasing, thanks to an accumulation of testable models and a large body of research over the last several decades. The vast majority of this work has been done in humans and laboratory animals because these study subjects and situations allow for tightly controlled experiments. However, it raises questions about how this knowledge can be applied to wild animals in their complex environments. Here, we review two prominent decision-making theories, dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory, to assess the similarities in these approaches and consider how they may apply to wild animals living in heterogenous environments within complicated social groupings. In particular, we wanted to assess when wild animals are likely to respond to a situation with a quick heuristic decision and when they are likely to spend more time and energy on the decision-making process. Based on the literature and evidence from our multi-destination routing experiments on primates, we find that individuals are likely to make quick, heuristic decisions when they encounter routine situations, or signals/cues that accurately predict a certain outcome, or easy problems that experience or evolutionary history has prepared them for. Conversely, effortful decision-making is likely in novel or surprising situations, when signals and cues have unpredictable or uncertain relationships to an outcome, and when problems are computationally complex. Though if problems are overly complex, satisficing via heuristics is likely, to avoid costly mental effort. We present hypotheses for how animals with different socio-ecologies may have to distribute their cognitive effort. Finally, we examine the conservation implications and potential cognitive overload for animals experiencing increasingly novel situations caused by current human-induced rapid environmental change.

Indexed as

Animals, WildBayes TheoremBehavior, AnimalDecision MakingAnimalsDecision TheoryHeuristicsPrimatesanthropocenecognitive overloadheuristicsmental effortsatisficing

Identifiers

PMID37839050
PMCPMC11650956

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.