ArticleScientific reports2023
Research on panic spread and decision behaviour in a delayed SEIR evolutionary game model under an emergency.
Article in Scientific reports, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Governing digital misinformation: A computational analysis of platform intervention using a three-party evolutionary game model.PloS one · 2026Article
- Natural disaster emergency response from a public policy perspective: a four-party evolutionary game among government, international organizations, healthcare institutions, and enterprises.Frontiers in public health · 2025Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Taking major emergencies as the research background, the transmission mechanism for panic spread and the decision behaviour of the opinion field are explored in this paper. By using evolutionary game theory to explore the game relationship between the official opinion field and the public opinion field and by considering the existence of strategy dependency in the same game group, the dependence coefficient is introduced to improve replicator dynamics. The dynamic delayed SEIR evolutionary game model is built by combining the epidemic model with the delay effect within the group, and the stability of the proposed model is analysed. The research results show that the strategy dependency among the same game group has positive and negative effects on the evolution process. The evolution of the dynamic delayed panic SEIR evolutionary game spread model under the effect of a positive effect is simulated. The results suggest that the official opinion field and the public opinion field should actively deal with emergencies, formulate effective control strategies to make the panic within the group disappear, and provide theoretical guidance for the relevant government to formulate plans.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.