Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37827740›Full record

Observational studyBMJ open2023

Evaluating the impact on health outcomes of an event that resulted in a delay in contact tracing of COVID-19 cases in England, September 2020: an observational study.

Lucy Findlater, Livia Pierotti, Charlie Turner, Adrian Wensley, Cong Chen, Shaun Seaman, Pantelis Samartsidis, Andre Charlett, Charlotte Anderson, Gareth Hughes and 3 more

Abstract readObservational Study
In one paragraph

Observational study in BMJ open, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

13 authors.

Lucy FindlaterUK Health Security Agency South of England, Bristol, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-1736-7661
Livia PierottiPopulation Health Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK livia.pierotti@bristol.ac.uk.
Charlie TurnerUK Health Security Agency East of England, Cambridge, UK.
Adrian WensleyUK Health Security Agency North of England, Leeds, UK.
Cong ChenUK Health Security Agency East of England, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-0355-3930
Shaun SeamanMRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-3726-5937
Pantelis SamartsidisMRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-4491-9655
Andre CharlettUK Health Security Agency, London, UK.ORCID 0000-0001-7154-0432
Charlotte AndersonUK Health Security Agency, London, UK.
Gareth HughesUK Health Security Agency North of England, Leeds, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-3781-0117
Matthew HickmanPopulation Health Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK.ORCID 0000-0001-9864-459X
Obaghe EdeghereUK Health Security Agency Midlands and East of England, Birmingham, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-4275-6338
Isabel OliverUK Health Security Agency South of England, Bristol, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-6106-1734

Funding

Medical Research Council MC_UU_00002/10Medical Research Council MC_UU_00002/11
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveIn September 2020, 15 861 SARS-CoV-2 case records failed to upload from the Second Generation Surveillance System (SGSS) to the Contact Tracing Advisory Service (CTAS) tool, delaying the contact tracing of these cases. This study used CTAS data to determine the impact of this delay on population health outcomes: transmission events, hospitalisations and mortality. Previously, a modelling study suggested a substantial impact.

designObservational study.

settingEngland. POPULATION: Individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 and their reported contacts.

main outcome measuresSecondary attack rates (SARs), hospitalisations and deaths among primary and secondary contacts were calculated, compared with all other concurrent, unaffected cases. Affected SGSS records were matched to CTAS records. Successive contacts and cases were identified and matched to hospital episode and mortality outcomes.

resultsInitiation of contact tracing was delayed by 3 days on average in the primary cases in the delay group (6 days) compared with the control group (3 days). This was associated with lower completion of contact tracing: 80% (95% CI: 79% to 81%) in delay group and 83% (95% CI: 83% to 84%) in control group. There was some evidence to suggest increased transmission to non-household contacts among those affected by the delay. The SAR for non-household contacts was higher among secondary contacts in the delay group than the control group (delay group: 7.9%, 95% CI: 6.5% to 9.2%; control group: 5.9%, 95% CI: 5.3% to 6.6%). There did not appear to be a significant difference between the delay and control groups in the odds of hospitalisation (crude OR: 1.1 (95% CI: 0.9 to 1.2)) or death (crude OR: 0.7 (95% CI: 0.1 to 4.0)) among secondary contacts.

conclusionsOur analysis suggests that the delay in contact tracing had a limited impact on population health outcomes; however, contact tracing was not completed for all individuals, so some transmission events might not be captured.

Indexed as

COVID-19Contact TracingEnglandHumansOutcome Assessment, Health CareSARS-CoV-2COVID-19EPIDEMIOLOGYINFECTIOUS DISEASESPUBLIC HEALTH

Identifiers

PMID37827740
PMCPMC10583033

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.